

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

April 23, 2010

TO: Timothy Dwyer, Technical Director
FROM: Donald Owen and David Kupferer, Oak Ridge Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Activity Report for Week Ending April 23, 2010

Mr. Kupferer was out of the office Monday through Thursday.

Uranium Processing Facility (UPF). As reported last week, B&W is preparing the first Critical Decision-2/3 (CD-2/3) package covering site preparation and long-lead procurement of some process equipment for submittal to YSO in June 2010. At the request of YSO, NNSA Headquarters personnel recently performed an Independent Project Review (IPR) focused on the first CD-2/3 package and provided numerous observations to the UPF project team during their out-brief two weeks ago. Several of the review team's observations were related to the project's implementation of DOE Standard 1189, *Integration of Safety into the Design Process*. The review team stated that the Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis (PDSA) provided in the package lacks the maturity and completeness for a PDSA as described in DOE Standard 1189. The IPR review team plans to issue its final report in a few weeks. B&W management continues to develop a document to illustrate how and when the planned design and safety basis deliverables will satisfy the intent of DOE Standard 1189.

Conduct of Operations/Hoisting and Rigging. YSO and B&W personnel discussed follow-up actions with the site rep. and staff regarding the critical lift of a 300-lb motor off Building 9212 where the sling configuration deviated from the critical lift plan (see last week's site rep. report). B&W identified the following key actions addressing factors noted last week: (1) evaluate the B&W Integrated Work Control Manual requirements (covers maintenance work including hoisting and rigging) regarding suspending work; a clear requirement to inform the shift manager upon discovery of an unexpected condition is lacking; (2) develop clear procedure use protocols requiring deliberate reference by workers to critical lift plan requirements; and (3) revise the site-wide B&W hoisting and rigging manual to clearly require specific verifications of rigging for each item designated a critical lift. Full development of corrective actions is in progress.

Feedback and Improvement/Conduct of Operations. Two years ago, in response to increasing the bounding quantity of hazardous materials assumed in certain weapon components, B&W issued a Standing Order that placed various restrictions on transferring the affected components between Y-12 nuclear facilities (see the 8/7/09, 10/17/08, and 6/6/08 site rep reports). At that time, YSO approved a Justification for Continued Operations that stated the Standing Order would remain in effect until the applicable safety basis documents (including Technical Safety Requirements) are revised, approved, and implemented. Last week, B&W discovered the Standing Order had expired two weeks ago even though the revised safety basis documents have yet to be approved and implemented (B&W submitted the revisions to YSO last month). B&W inadvertently allowed this same Standing Order to expire twice in 2008. B&W determined that the restrictions implemented by the Standing Order were not violated. B&W has initiated assessments to determine the following: (a) why previous corrective actions were ineffective at preventing recurrence of this issue and (b) whether Standing Orders are being properly distributed, tracked, and incorporated into procedures.